The unique ability to identify one's own body and experience it as one's own is 1 fundamental in goal-oriented behavior and survival. However, the mechanisms 2 underlying the so-called body ownership are yet not fully understood. The plasticity of 3 body ownership has been studied using two experimental methods or their variations. 4 Specifically, the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), where the tactile stimuli are externally 5 generated, or the moving RHI which implies self-initiated movements. Grounded in 6 these paradigms, evidence has demonstrated that body ownership is a product of 7 bottom-up reception of self-and externally-generated multisensory information and 8 top-down comparison between the predicted and the actual sensory stimuli. Crucially, 9 provided the design of the current paradigms, where one of the manipulated cues always 10 involves the processing of a proximal modality sensing the body or its surface (e.g., 11 touch), the contribution of sensory signals which pertain to the environment remain 12 elusive. Here we propose that, as any robust percept, body ownership depends on the 13 integration and prediction of all the sensory stimuli, and therefore it will depend on the 14 consistency of purely distal sensory signals pertaining to the environment. To test our 15 hypothesis, we create an embodied goal-oriented task and manipulate the predictability 16 of the surrounding environment by changing the congruency of purely distal 17 multisensory cues while preserving bodily and action-driven signals entirely predictable. 18 Our results empirically reveal that the way we represent our body is contingent upon all 19 the sensory stimuli including purely distal and action-independent signals which pertain 20 to the environment. 21 65 initially, the illusion of owning the fake hand was interpreted as a passive perceptual 66 state whose strength was correlated with temporal discrepancies between seen and felt 67 sensory stimuli (both necessary and sufficient). In the light of recent findings, however, 68 this traditional view on body ownership as resulting purely from perceptual correlations 69 does not seem sufficient [66] . In particular, it has been widely accepted that despite its 70 flexibility, in the context of externally-generated sensory cues (e.g., tactile strokes as in 71 the RHI), body ownership somewhat requires physical, anatomical, postural and spatial 72 congruency of the real (felt) and fake (viewed) hands [14, 25, 35, 45, 48, 68] . These 73 findings strongly suggest that the interpretation of the 'novel' sensory evidence and 74 possible incorporation of the rubber hand into the representation of the body is 75 constrained by top-down prior knowledge driven by experience [2, 5, 44, 68] . In 76 particular, the perception of ownership seems to rely on an internal model of the body 77 which relates the physical aspects of the perceived rubber hand to the inputs received 78 through a history of sensorimotor interactions of an agent with the world [2, 66] . 79 Interestingly, this hypothesis is consistent with the general framework which proposes 80 2/18 that perception is controlled by top-down processes allowing to create predictions about 81 the forthcoming sensory events based on previous experience and generalized 82 knowledge [21, 27, 40]. As such, it is an active process in which all acquired sensory 83 information is continuously compared against experience-driven internal models of the 84 self and the environment [7, 10, 23, 47, 53] . 85 Grounded in the framework of active perception, Ferri and colleagues [23, 24] studied 86 whether body ownership can be modulated by a pure expectation of exafferent tactile 87 feedback in the absence of actual physical touch of either the fake or the real body-parts. 88 Interestingly, their experiment revealed that a mere expectation of an upcoming sensory 89 event, predicted by an anticipatory response in multisensory parietal cortices, is indeed 90 sufficient to induce the experience of ownership over the rubber hand, measured 91 subjectively and objectively. However, the tactile stimulation is not necessary [23, 24] 92 (see also [62] ). This result emphasizes the predictive processing in the emergence of the 93 sense of body ownership challenging the traditionally defined boundaries of an embodied 94 self. In the present study, we extend this hypothesis and propose that, as any coherent 95 percept, body ownership is a result of bottom-up integration and top-down prediction of 96 all the sensory stimuli processed by proximal and distal modalities including those 97 which pertain purely to the environment. Hence, we propose that body ownership will 98 depend on the consistency of distal sensory signals which occur in the environment even 99 if they are independent of self-initiated actions. To test this hypothesis, we create an 100 embodied goal-oriented task using virtual reality and manipulate the predictability of 101 the surrounding environment by changing its rules while preserving bodily and 102 action-driven signals fully predictable. We predict that body ownership of a virtual 103 avatar will be negatively influenced in the condition where purely external sensory 104 signals underlying the statistical structure of the environment are not predictable.
Introduction 22
The sense of body ownership, which allows us to determine the boundaries between the 23 own physical self and the external world, and therefore the source of a given sensation, 24 is fundamental in adaptive goal-oriented behavior and survival [11, 16, 71, 74] . Indeed, 25 during the last three decades, scientists have increasingly questioned both the behavioral 26 and neural mechanisms driving the emergence and experience of body ownership as well 27 as its flexibility [2, 5, 6, 20, 23, 66] . Together, the results support the notion that the way 28 1/18 we perceive our body strongly relies on an interplay between (1) bottom-up reception, 29 combination, and integration of self-generated (reafferent) and externally-generated 30 (exafferent) information from multiple sensory sources, and (2) top-down comparison 31 between the expected and the actual sensory stimuli [2, 5, 6, 68] . At the empirical level, 32 the principles underlying bodily representation (in healthy subjects) have been studied 33 using bodily illusions [13] . A well-established experimental paradigm is the Rubber . Then they are randomly split into two experimental conditions: congruent ("C", green arrow) and incongruent ("I", black arrow) and they undergo the Experimental Block. At the end of the experiment, all the participants experience the Threatening Event. 134 Virtual Air Hockey Task. The objective of each session was to complete a 135 goal-oriented motor task that consisted of hitting a virtual puck into a goal, as 136 accurately as possible ( Figure 1A ). Prior to the experiment, subjects received 137 instructions to place their hands in square-shaped Go Areas (GA; one for the left and 138 one for the right hand) at the beginning of every trial. The trial started, and the puck 139 appeared only when the system detected that both hands are in the GAs. Importantly, 140 although both hands were mapped and rendered in the virtual scene, the task was to be 141 completed using the right arm exclusively. To counteract repetitive movement-patterns 142 and prevent habituation the puck was spawned pseudorandomly in one of the five 143 Starting Positions (SP) distributed evenly within the right-hand workspace ( Figure   144 1A2). The game was designed such that the puck did not bounce against the walls.
145
Thus a trial consisted of one hit only which could end in either a success (i.e., the puck 146 enters the goal) or a failure (i.e., the puck hits one of the walls). Both events were 147 immediately indicated by auditory feedback in the form of semantically corresponding 148 sound, positive or negative respectively. Pertaining to the task, this feedback was always 149 congruent and fully predictable. The puck was visible throughout the experiment.
150
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Protocol and Sensory Manipulations. . In the EB, subjects were randomly split into two groups: Congruent "C" 157 (green), and Incongruent "I" (black) ( Figure 1D ). To investigate whether sensory cues 158 which pertain to the environment influence body ownership in the experimental 159 condition ("I"), we manipulated the congruency, and therefore the predictability, of 160 visual and auditory action-independent cues from the virtual scene.
161
The scene consisted of (1) the virtual arms, (2) an Air Hockey field, (3) the puck, (4) 162 a goal, (5) benches for the audience, (6) the Go Signal (GS), and (7) a clock (Figure 1 ). 163 The virtual solar time was indicated by the position of the sun in the sky (i.e., visual 164 cue), while the virtual space (setting) was signaled by the background sound 165 representative for a given place (i.e., auditory cue; e.g., the sound of the air-hockey field) 166 ( Figure 1C ). The default scene was set at midday (setting:time) on a hockey field 167 (setting:location). Both in the Training Block (identical for both conditions) and the 168 Experimental Block of the Congruent condition "C" all the scene components 169 mentioned above, as well as the temporal and spatial settings, remained fixed such that 170 their behavior was always fully predictable. Moreover, in all conditions, all the auditory 171 and visual signals relevant to the body within the peripersonal space and to the task 172 (i.e., Air Hockey field, the puck, the goal, and the Go Signal, the trajectory of the puck, 173 outcome of the action) were always congruent and fully predictable. Crucially, in the 174 Experimental Block of the Incongruent condition ("I"), the default behavior of the 175 scene components and the temporal and spatial settings randomly changed. In 176 particular, we manipulated: (1) spatial orientation of the benches by rotating them on 177 the z-axis, (2) spatial orientation of the clock by modulating the velocity and the virtual space by altering the background sound (i.e., sounds representative for a concert, 181 cinema). Importantly, to ensure that the sensory manipulations in "I" impact 182 exclusively the perception of the environment and not the action, they were always 183 introduced between the end of a trial (the puck enters the goal or hits one of the walls) 184 and the beginning of the consecutive one. Specifically, they were triggered at a random 185 time within a 2 seconds time window after the end of each trial. The incongruencies 186 were introduced gradually, and they were pseudorandomly distributed such that the 187 participants could not attribute action-driven causality to their emergence.
188
Measures.
189
Self-reports. In virtual environments, the sense of presence refers to the subjective 190 experience of 'being there', despite the physical distance. In particular, when a user 191 does not perceive the influence of technology during a virtual reality-based 192 experience [57, 72] . To ensure that the participants in both groups felt equally immersed 193 within the proposed environment, we asked them to complete a presence questionnaire 194 at the end of the experiment by assessing each of the items on a 9-point Likert Scale 195 (see Table2 for the full list of items). Furthermore, to evaluate the subjective experience 196 of body ownership and agency, we administered a 12 item questionnaire (Table 1) 197 adapted from previous studies [38, 46] . There were six questions per domain, three of 198 which served as controls. Participants answered each statement on a 7-point Likert
199
Scale ranging from '-3': being in strong disagreement to '3': being in strong agreement. 200 To counteract order effects, the sequence of questions was randomized. Galvanic Skin Response (GSR). GSR is a physiological measure of the 202 autonomous nervous system, which increases as a reaction to an arousing stimulus.
203
Similar to other studies [3], here, we used GSR as a proxy for the ownership illusion. In 204 particular, at the end of the Experimental Block in each condition, we measured GSR 205 responses to an unexpected threat (i.e., a knife falling to stab the right virtual hand).
206
To prevent movement-driven muscular artifacts, we recorded GSR from the left hand 207 which did not move during the experiment. The signal was recorded using Arduino 208 e-Health board at a sampling rate of 33Hz from two flat reversible silver/silver chloride 209 (Ag-AgCl) electrodes which were attached to the middle and index fingers, respectively. 210 We stored the GSR during the whole experiment interval for each participant. The data 211 were preprocessed to extract phasic components from tonic activity based on 212 Continuous Decomposition Analysis (CDA) [4] as implemented in the Ledalab software 213 (Leipzig, Germany). For the analysis, we computed the number of phasic skin 214 conductance responses (nSCR) above 0.01mS 1 second following the threatening event 215 and compared it between the two conditions.
216
Hand Withdrawal (HW). We collected kinematic movement data from the Kinect 217 for each participant throughout the experiment. All the data from the system was 218 recorded at 33Hz. To quantify the execution of instinctive defensive movements such as 219 hand withdrawal in response to the unexpected threatening event (i.e., the virtual knife 220 stabbing the virtual hand) [30], we computed the velocity of displacement of the right 221 virtual hand as a difference in the cumulative sum of the X (forward and backward) and 222 Y (up and down) positions at every time step. The results were compared between the 223 two conditions. Due to possibly stronger assimilation of the virtual hand to the 224 representation of the body, we expected higher velocity of movement in "C" than in "I". 225
Performance measures. To evaluate performance, we measured scores, angular 226 errors as well as reaction and response times, all stored by the system. Scores were 227 calculated as the percentage of successful trials, namely, the times when the puck 228 entered the gate ( Figure 1A1 ). An angular error was computed as the difference 229 between the actual direction vector and a straight line between the starting position of 230 the puck and the middle of the goal (desired trajectory, Figure 1A3 ). Reaction times 231 were the time intervals between the apparition of the puck and the moment of 'leaving' 232 the starting position to hit it, while the response times were the time intervals between 233 6/18 the apparition of the puck and the moment of its collision with the hand.
234
The statistical analysis followed nonparametric methods. Hence, we used the Presence and agency. First, we assessed the perceived experience of presence and 252 agency. The analysis revealed that in both conditions participants felt present in the 253 proposed virtual environment ("C": µ = 1.6, std = 1.56 and "I": µ = 1.51, std = 1.8)
254
( Figure 2 ). Crucially, we found no differences between the groups in the self-reported 255 scores (p = 0.47). Table2 presents individual questionnaire items as well as the results of 256 between-group analyses for the associated questions. None of the comparisons yielded a 257 statistically significant difference. We further report no difference in the experienced 258 sense of agency between "C" (µ = 1.19, std = 1.24) and "I" (µ = 1.3, std = 1.3) (p = 0.08) 259 (Figure 2) , and the groups did not differ in the agency control questions (p = 0.1).
260
Performance. Our results revealed that the normalized performance-scores (i.e., the 261 proportion of successful trials) did not differ between the Congruent (µ = 0.6, std = 0.17) 262 How much did visual aspects involve you? 0.476
How natural was the movement mechanism 0.34
How compelling was the sense of objects moving 0.21
How consistent were the experiences with real world ones 0.384
Were you able to anticipate consequences of your actions 0.22
Were you able to survey the environment using vision 0.39
How compelling was the sense of moving around 0.36
How closely were you able to examine objects 0.22
Were you able to examine objects from multiple viewpoints 0.2
How involved were you in the virtual reality experience 0.18
How much delay did you experience 0.476
How quickly did you adjust to the virtual reality experience 0.4
How proficient in interacting did you feel at the end 0.439
How much did visual aspects distract from the task 0.38
How much did the control devices interfere with performance 0.373
How well could you concentrate on the assigned tasks 0.164
How much did auditory aspects involve you 0.064
How well could you identify sounds 0.474
How well could you localize sounds 0.21 and the Incongruent (µ = 0.59, std = 0.18) conditions (p = 0.5). We further analyzed the 263 angular error as a proxy to performance, stored throughout the experiment. We report 264 that while both groups significantly improved during the Training Block (TB), in the 265 Experimental Block (EB) the errors stabilized ( Figure 3 ). Specifically, there was a 266 statistically significant difference between the early and late trials in both "C" (early Block. We found, however, no within-group differences for the early and late trials in (p = 0.15) nor the EB (N = 10, p = 0.15) ( Figure 3) demonstrating that, overall, the 275 conditions did not differ with respect to performance. Finally, our analysis showed no 276 statistically significant differences in either response ("C": µ = 2.35, std = 0.78 and "I": 277 µ = 2.43, std = 0.67; p = 0.1) or reaction times ("C": µ = 1.01, std = 1.41 and "I":
278 µ = 1.63, std = 1.14; p = 0.3) between the two conditions during the Experimental Block. 279 Hence both groups took the same time to initiate the movement and hit the puck, 280 further suggesting that the proposed manipulation of action-independent sensory signals 281 in "I" did not alter or bias performance.
282
Body Ownership. The analysis revealed a statistical difference in the self-reported 283 experience of body ownership between the two conditions (p = 0.04) such that the scores 284 were significantly higher in "C" (µ = 0.6, std = 0.9) than in "I" (µ = 0.05, std = 1.45)
285
( Figure 2 ). Importantly, we found no differences in the control questions 286 * Figure 4 . GSR results. The plot represents the difference between the groups in the number of galvanic skin responses (nGSR) post stabbing event.
between the groups (p = 0.1). To further explore the effects we found a statistically significant difference between the 299 groups in the numbers of activations (p = 0.003) such that the 300 number was significantly higher in "C" (µ = 2.58, std = 1.11) 301 than in "I" (µ = 1.833, std = 0.98) ( Figure 4 ).
302
Finally, we observed that in the congruent condition 303 participants exhibited faster velocity of the right virtual 304 hand displacement post threatening event (Hand Withdrawal, 305 Figure 5 ). In particular, the statistical analysis revealed that 306 the difference between "I" and "C" in the cumulative sum of the X and Y position over 307 time reached statistical significance at second 4 post threatening event ( Figure 5 ).
308
Discussion
309
The unique ability to recognize one's own body, experience it as our own, and localize it 310 in space lies in the continuous processing of self-(i.e., reafferent) and processed by purely distal modalities (i.e., visual and auditory). Thus, for the first time, 319 we empirically reveal that the way we represent our body is contingent upon all the 320 sensory stimuli including signals occurring outside the peripersonal space. We interpret 321 our results from the perspective of active perception and propose that, similar to any 
338
The contribution of top-down processing in the emergence of body ownership is 339 further supported in the context of self-generated cues such as in the moving Rubber sources, which reflect the discrepancies between the expected and the actual sensory 348 stimuli, inform the brain about the current state of the environment and the body, 349 shaping the experience of ownership. For instance, when the visual feedback of the 350 virtual hand does not match the expected one (e.g., the hand follows a different 351 trajectory than the executed one) the SPEs pertaining to the body increase resulting in 352 a decreased experience of ownership over the virtual avatar [18, 58] . Interestingly, even 353 purely distal auditory consequences of self-generated movements bias the experience of 354 ownership provided that they are relevant to the task, thus informing about the 355 magnitude of the error [33].
356
The evidence discussed above suggests that body ownership is compromised when 357 the actual sensory signals violate the expected cues independently of whether they are 358 externally-(RHI) or self-generated (mRHI). If body ownership depends on the matching 359 between the predicted and the actual sensory stimuli, can it, in a similar way, be affected 360 by prediction errors about the sensory signals pertaining to the environment? To answer 361 this question, we designed a virtual reality-based paradigm where participants were to 362 complete a motor task (Air Hockey) and manipulated the predictability of the purely 363 external cues by randomly changing the rules of the environment. Our findings establish that incongruencies in action-independent and task-irrelevant 373 sensory cues, which inform about the statistical structure of the environment and are 374 processed by purely distal modalities, modulate the experience of body ownership. In 375 particular, we found that the congruent (as compared to incongruent) environment led 376 to an enhanced experience of ownership over the virtual hand, as measured subjectively 377 by a questionnaire (Figure 2) , behaviorally using the hand withdrawal ( Figure 5 ), and 378 objectively through the galvanic skin responses (Figure 4) . Crucially, however, there 379 were no effects regarding the experience of presence (Table 2 and Figure 2 ) supporting 380 that, despite the introduced manipulations, the environment was overall immersive [57] . 381 We propose that the violation of expectations in the context of the proposed 382 paradigm can be understood as a sudden increase of uncertainty in the internal model 383 of the environment. According to biologically-constrained models of the neocortex, the 384 link between these two components could be mediated by neuromodulators which signal 385 uncertainty such as norepinephrine or acetylcholine [1] . Consequently, a significant (Figure 2, 4 expect that after more prolonged exposure to the incongruent stimuli in "I", the 408 experience of ownership as measured by questionnaires, hand withdrawal, and GSR 409 would return to normal such that there would be no differences in the perceived 410 ownership between the two conditions. Further work shall systematically address this 411 question by running additional trials to assess the temporal evolution of body ownership 412 in the context of an incongruent environment.
413
What about performance? Our results demonstrate that the sensory manipulations 414 in the incongruent condition did not affect either the self-reported experience of agency 415 (Figure 2 ) or the performance measured through scores, angular errors ( Figure 3) or 416 response times. On the one hand, we designed the paradigm such that all the bodily 417 (i.e., within the peripersonal space), action-driven (reafferent) and task-relevant stimuli 418 were always congruent and therefore fully predictable. Specifically, the 1:1 mapping 419 between the real and the virtual hands ensured that the visual feedback of the 420 movements in virtual reality fully reflected the movements of the real hands resulting in 421 visuomotor congruency. Similar to the peripersonal signals, the consequences of actions 422 in the extrapersonal space signaled by auditory and visual feedback reflected real-world 423 physics and were fully predictable. That is, the sound of the puck temporarily and 424 spatially corresponded to the location of its collision with the environment (i.e., the 425 walls or the goal). On the other hand, we also experimentally controlled for the 426 occurrence of the sensory manipulations to ensure that they are action-independent. 427 Specifically, they were always introduced randomly between the end of a trial and the 428 beginning of the next one. Finally, neither did the manipulated signals in "I" inform 429 about the outcomes of the task (i.e., knowledge of performance) nor did they affect 430 motor performance, which made them task-irrelevant. Indeed, the goal of every 431 experimental session was to complete the motor task as accurately as possible by hitting 432 the puck into the goal. We thus speculate that the congruency (and therefore the 433 predictability) of all the sensory information relevant to the effector and the target in 434 both conditions resulted in an unbiased performance and reinforced the experience of 435 agency, that is the experience of controlling one's actions, and, through them, events in 436 the outside world [36, 73] .
437
In conclusion, our results support the notion that the plasticity of body ownership 438 depends on an active interplay between the experience-driven top-down predictions and 439 bottom-up prediction errors driven by purely external and action-independent cues 440 which pertain to the environment. Hence, these findings extend current accounts by 441 demonstrating that the sensory evidence necessary for constructing ownership goes 442 beyond the body and the peripersonal space [48] . In line with the motor control and 443 perception studies, our data support a functional coupling between the predictive 444 (generative) models of the body and environment [51] . Moreover, our results are 445 consistent with previous findings which demonstrate that body ownership, in fact, 446 affects the perception of certain aspects of the environment (i.e., size of objects) [71] , 447 which suggests a bidirectional link between the internal models of the environment and 448 the body. Future work should include a systematic study of the weighting of specific 449 exafferent and reafferent unimodal and multisensory information in modulating the 450 experience of body ownership under different tasks as well as their neural underpinnings. 451
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At this point, however, we expect that the current findings will allow for the 452 advancement of our understanding of the principles underlying the emergence and 453 experience of body ownership, which we propose can be understood in a framework of 454 active inference of all the signals within and outside of the peripersonal space. We 455 believe that the reported results can also contribute to the development of robust 456 computer-based paradigms for the treatment of neurological disorders of cognitive, 457 perceptual, and motor functions.
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